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François Grignon, Alamin Mazrui, Marcel Ruiten
On 29 December 1997, Kenyans went to thé poils to choose their presidential,
parliamentary and civic représentations. Thèse multi-party élections offered
an opportunity for thé Kenyan voters to choose between candidates from
différent political parties. However, thé Kenyan 1997 général élections were
a knockout in which thé counting exercise was a crucial part. Out far thé
Count! thé title of this book describes ils contents. Notwithstanding other
shortcomings, it was the flawed ballot count of thé parliamentary votes in at
least three constituencies (Westlands, Changamwe, Kitui West), that enabled
KANU to secure a majority in parliament. In other words, thé 107-103 KANU
majonty should have been at least a 106-104 victory for thé opposition,
notwithstanding ils own sometimes shady victories (i.e., Fafi). Indeed, in the
end it was through thé counting exercise that thé opposition was denied a
majority.
This book is somehow the story of how KANU manipulated the 1997
général élections. This may have been in many ways, but three of them stand
out above the rest. First, through thé government, KANU enjoyed total
control on thé issuance of ID cards which enabled the party to exercise
extensive influence on voter registrations. Secondly, thé use of the same
black ballot boxes as in 1992, includmg thé 150 which were never recovered
by thé Electoral Commission of Kenya in 1993 was open to abuse by thé
party. Thirdly, KANU party agents were not only able to intimidate some
voters, but they also manipulated the law by 'helping' the illiterate voters to
mark thé ballot papers. Needless to say, this was the highest violation of the
rule of 'secret ballot' and put the electors at the mercy of the violence so
systematically deployed by foremost, though not solely, thé KANU youth
surrounding thé polling stations.
The book gives a far broader list of the necessary changes in thé électoral
System for it to become genuinely 'free and fair'. It also gives a number of
other highlights on Kenya's électoral politics, which are revealing of ils culture
of politics.
Like justice in thé courts of law, élections are a démocratie exercise that
must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. But thé sample of
serious flaws in thé électoral process which has been descnbed in this book -
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from thé initial phases of constituency détermination to the later phases of
actual voting and vote counting - did httle to accord it even a modicum of
legitimacy in thé eyes of thé Kenyan public. In spite of all thèse flaws and
irregularities, however, élection observers concluded that, on the whole, the
results of thé élections reflected the wishes of Kenyan voters. But how were
these wishes of Kenyan voters determined in thé first place? The logic adopted
was that even after statistically factoring in ail thé irregularities - often a cover-
up term for rigging - into thé counting of thé votes, thé élection results would
still favour Moi and KANU. This is a logic that essentially views democratie
élections as outcome rather than process. And it is precisely the logic that
lent political legitimacy to the 'Out for thé Count' culture in électoral politics.
Nothing eise really matters beyond the final numbers of votes, no matter how
those numbers were eventually arrived at. Are observers, therefore, contributing,
even if unwittingly, to the entrenchment of the prevailing mood of satisfaction
with thé appearance of democracy devoid of any real substance?
Sometimes, there hâve also been the patronising sentiments expressed
by sections of thé foreign diplomatie establishment that in spite of the serious
lapses in thé process, ils results should stand because it constitutes a major
step towards democracy. A relativist twist is thus invoked to justify thé
acceptance, in the African context, of what would otherwise have been totally
unacceptable in Europe and America as part of the libéral démocratie package.
Moreover, some diplomats in need of influence, usually compçting for thé
marketing of their institutional set-ups, are often hit by a stränge kind of
amnesia and oversize"d self-confidence in thé superiority of their own political
System.
Ask them about élection rigging, campaign violence, corruption and they
will half-heartedly admit that, indeed, in certain circumstances thèse
unfortunatelrregularities occur in their respective politics, but they cannot
seriously be compared with what happens in Africa. Their polities are mature,
complex, based on ideological debates nurtured by thé class and religious
divides of thé Western societies, not on 'primary' or utilitarian patterns of
identification such as ethnicity.
Learning from thé 1992 and 1997 général élections, it is easy to draw the
conclusion that the principle of 'free and fair élections' will be better upheld
by solving thé myriad of technical and logistical problems associated with
administrative corruption and inefficiency corne thé next round of élections.
Important and necessary as thèse changes are, however, they will amount to
little if thé entirety of thé process continues to be seen by thé électorale as less
than 'free and fair'. No amount of administrative efficiency, for example, would
hâve convinced thé majority of Kenyans of the fairness of the process as
long as its administration (thé électoral commission) was directed by a person
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(Z. Chesoni) who, m their eyes, lacked both indépendance and the will to be
independent, as well as political credibility.
A real challenge in the consolidation of democratie élections in Kenya,
therefore, lies partly in greater transparency and accountability of the process
in a way that will foster public perceptions, trust and confidence that thé
élections were truly 'free and fair'.
The verdict that thé results of thé élections were a fair reflection of the
wishes of Kenyans, the many flaws notwithstanding, brings us directly to thé
question of élection observation. The end of the Cold War precipitated major
changes in thé global political arena which led to the émergence of an
'international consensus that assistance in thé organisation of free élections is
a new phase in state-building' (Gershman 1993:10).
In addition to économie libéralisation and performance, therefore, thé
political performance of countries receiving aid from thé West now became a
condition for continued support. And, as a resuit, international monitoring
and observation of élections in thèse countries assumed new importance in
evaluating thé degree of compliance by récipient nations with thé political
conditionality that was demanded by international donors for thé disbursement
of aid. International observation and monitoring thus became part of the new
agenda of globalisation of Western forms of démocratie électoral practice.
Earlier international observation attempts, however, soon revealed a
number of problems. Most international governments and agencies could
not afford to send more than a limited number of observers to thé élection
and most of thèse tended to establish a présence for only a few days before
and after élections. Their small numerical size imposed limitations on thé
size of thé terrain they could cover and on how closely they could observe
thé process. Lack of proficiency in thé local languages and lack of familiarity
with local cultures also impacted on how well they could comprehend what
they observed. Finally, thé observers' task was too narrowly focussed on thé
élection process to thé exclusion of the wider political context and process
within which thé élections were taking place.
To remedy some of thèse problems, international organisations sought to
support and encourage thé complémentation of international observation with
thé more extensive network of domestic observation through co-ordination
with local non-governmental organisations. In Kenya, this collaborative venture
was first attempted in 1992, and as explained in the introduction, it was
tremendously improved upon in the 1997 général élections through a number
of innovative stratégies. In a country like Kenya where the regime has been
openly hostile to élection observation, thé relationship between international
and local observers proved to be particularly useful and symbiotic.
The institutionalisation of domestic observation holds some promise for
démocratisation in Kenya. At the very minimum, its active présence reaffirms
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local commitment, among thé élite as well as thé général citizenry, to thé
principle of free and fair élections, démocratie procédure and due process.
This affirmation, in turn, has the potential of galvanising the society, leading
it eventually towards a new électoral culture of greater transparency and
accountability. This potential development is particularly feasible in contexts
like Kenya, where domestic observation is becoming an acceptée feature of
électoral politics.
But to what extent are local observers seen to be neutral enough to gain
legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate? Unlike international observers,
domestic observers are often considered to be vulnérable to local political
pressures from various interest groups. The fact that thé local observer group
rushed to give its stamp of approval to thé results of flawed 1997 général
élections raised serious questions about its non-partisanship in carrying out
its mission. But how realistic would thé quest be for total political neutrality
on thé part of local observers? Would it not make better sensé to strive for
greater représentation in thé domestic observation machinery of différent
stakeholders who can then act as checks and balances in relation to each
other?
But, if domestic observers are seen to represent particular interest groups
in thé political process, international observers are often suspected of
harbouring a hidden agenda on behalf of their respective countries. And
because the sincerity of the Western nations' own commitment to genuine
démocratisation in Kenya is deemed suspect, international observers are often
regarded as 'imperialist' pawns who hâve corne to endorse a pre-determined
outcome of the élection exercise. Commenting on thé 1992 général élections,
for example, Emeka Nwokedi has noted that 'despite the criticism of the
flawed élection in Kenya, especially by thé United States, thé unanimous
opinion expressed by thé international observers that thé results should stand,
set thé tone for western policy towards democratization in Kenya' (1995:203).
To thé extent that thé objective assessment of élections is not seen to be
genuinely a part of thé agenda of donor countries, their représentatives are
not likely to be seen as crédible observers and monitors of the élection process.
Like domestic observers in thé local context, however, it would probably
be naive to expect foreign observers to act in a manner that is unmediated by
thé politico-économie interests of the Western world. At the same time,
however, one notices greater intra-EU compétition, on the one hand, and
compétition between thé USA and other EU allies, on thé other. In this respect,
thé USA stood on their own throughout thé élection observation exercise
and only came back actively within the DDDG Election Observation Centre
in thé end, in support of the British, the Japanese and the Canadians in order
to block the 'undiplomatic' proposition to reveal immediately and publicly
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the findings on the most blatant frauds and instead produce more of a
government-to-government document (Economie Review 23/02-02/03/98).
But let us assume for the moment that the élection observers were right
that, everything else being equal - which it certainly was not - the élection
results were indeed stacked against the opposition. How, then, can we explain
the élection outcome in favour of a regime that is decidedly unpopulär? The
chapters in this volume have provided several explanations for this seeming
anomaly, some of which are shared by the Kenyan public at large. Prominent
among these is the thesis of a divided opposition. There were indeed several
attempts behind the scènes - all of which came to nought - to get various
opposition parties to field one presidential candidate against KANU's Daniel
arap Moi.
Even when this initiative did not succeed, however, it was anticipated that,
with strong presidential contenders in Central, Eastern, Nyanza and Western
provinces, Moi was unlikely to garner the required minimum of 25 per cent of
the votes in at least fïve provinces. This indeterminate outcome would have
forced a run-off élection between Moi and one candidate from the opposition.
Indeed an opinion poll on presidential popularity conducted in June and July
of 1997 among some 1,600 Kenyans covering all eight provinces concluded
that the only likely candidate to beat Daniel arap Moi in a run-off would be
Charity Ngilu. All other aspirants would not receive the much-needed support
from other opposition zones. In a run-off against Wamalwa, Matiba, Raila or
Kibaki, Moi would score from 60 to 64 per cent, whereas versus Ngilu hè
would lose, gaining no more than 35 per cent of the votes (see ACCORD
1997). The voting pattern in both Eastern and Western provinces, however,
failed to meet this expectation of the opposition.
For whatever it is worth as a 'strategy' for ousting Moi, however, the
électoral politics of a united/divided opposition essentially betrayed the narrow
vision of democracy prevalent in much of the country. Generally, there was
much less concern with democratie practices and processes than with blocking
Moi and KANU from winning the élections. Sections of the opposition were
often willing to accept blatant flaws in the élection procès» well before the
polling day as long as it appeared to them that they stood some chance of
being the eventual victors - a status, which they have always been in a hurry
to attain. Well before the élections, the 25 per cent rule was repeatedly attacked
not because it was undemocratic in any principied manner, but only because
it was seen to favour Moi. Moi and KANU, rather than democracy, turned
out to be the real issue: and because it was simply 'Out for the Count', the
opposition became a cause for ils own undoing. It is, nonetheless, true that
by reason of internai divisions within the opposition, the (illegitimate) narrow
win for KANU became possible. Had there been better co-ordination between
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the opposition parties in the fielding of their candidates, the fraudulent counts
would not have been able to make up for the loss of some 15 seats where the
combined opposition gathered more votes than KANU. The constituencies
where much of this fraud took place are mainly to be found in the Coast,
Eastern and Western provinces.
Then there was KANU's own capacity to reinvent itself. In its bid to
ensure its own survival as a ruling party, KANU has incorporated into its
organism a blend of new politicians - some well educated and highly
motivated - who, as long as they support Moi, have had the space to
demonstrate their leadership potential. Even once avowed enemies of KANU
and the establishment, like Jembe Mwakalu of Bahari constituency, have not
only been accommodated in the party and allowed to pursue their own brand
of politics, but they have actually been rewarded by their landslide victories
in their respective constituencies. In other words, KANU has allowed its
own political face to change in conformity with the changing political reality.
And the fact that the leading opposition parties were not at all different
from KANU in ideological orientation, made its transformation that much
casier: opposition parties seemed to provide the promise of new leadership
without the potential of new direction. lts new guise, after all, need not be
substantially different from the old one in order to be at par with opposition
parties in offering a 'new kind' of leadership.
Finally, there was the ethnie factor. Chapter after chapter in this book has
demonstrated how much force ethnicity has in électoral politics, sometimes,
as in the case of the Rift Valley and the Coast, with tragic and bloody
conséquences. KANU as much as the opposition parties has continued to
gravitate around thé ethnie pôle. It continued to play on the fears of the so-
called ethnie minorities in places like thé Coast and North-Eastern Province.
And even in Western Province Moi's success was perhaps partly attributable
to thé 'ethnie minority card' to thé extent that thé region's ethnie profile is a
lot more heterogeneous than it is often presumed to be. On thé other hand,
despite thé millions of shillings that were poured into thé Central Province
by thé Central Province Development Support Group of tycoons like Stanley
Githunguri and S.K. Macharia in support of KANU, the party lost miserably
to the seemingly Kikuyu-based party, the DR
But as indicated in the introduction and demonstrated in several of the
chapters, it would be naïve to interpret these results simply as manifestations
of an uncompromising ethnie consciousness on the part of the Kenyan
electorale. At the bottom of it all is a struggle for the distribution of power and
resources in a political system which, over the decades, has been designed to
thrive on the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Voters, therefore, see élections
as a way of attracting resources to their own communities but, in a multi-
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party context, they often do so '.., by voting for the party that most community
members believe represents the interests of the géographie région in which
they réside. Because geographical attachments and considérations of ethnicity
are the defining attributes of voters' interests, political parties invariably émerge
that purposely appeal to the inhabitants of some région more than others'
(Barkan 1997:14). The pursuit of multi-party élections in Kenya, in other
words, has taken place in a context where ethnicity has either been exploited
for political gain or is a manifestation of underlying struggles between
communities based on material interests necessary for collective survival.
The régional distribution of the support for political parties also reflects this
factor. Extreme caution must be exercised, however, when making genera!
statements on the interplay between ethnicity and party politics. There is
currently no real sociology of political parties in Kenya. How KANU, DP or
FORD-Kenya really interact with their electorale is still, to a gréât extent, an
enigma. It is only when politicians and their audiences will be recorded and
understood when expressing themselves in their mother longues, thaï il will
be possible to establish a crédible pattern of data analysis and hâve a clear
picture of the actual changes within Kenya's cullure of politics (see an attempt
in Grignon 1998a and 1998b).
An adjustment of the 'winner-take-all' constituency sysiem is called for.
Proportional representalion seems to be able to prevent some of Ihe
disadvanlages of thé constiluency System as it has developed in thé Kenyan
setting. As for now, losing an élection is economically a disadvantage.
Politicians thus hâve an interest in igniting mistrust or reverling to violence lo
reach iheir goals and stay, or gel into, power.
What seems lo be needed mosl is lo de-link Ihe narrow interests of
politicians from those of Iheir respective régions. Moreover, thé current system
is blocking a voter from choosing the party he or she wants to support in thé
parliameniary or presidenlial conlesl since nol every party is able to field a
candidate in each constiluency.
In a proportional électoral system KANU would hâve won 93
parliamentary seals in thé 1997 général élections, i.e, wilhoul an absolute
majorily (see Table A2.1 page 629). This would hâve allowed KANU, wilh
thé largest number of parliamentary seats, to try to form a coalition
governmenl, for example, wilh DP, NDP, FORD-Kenya or any olher
combination resulting in a majority of MPs supporting thé cabinet. This
way a government wouîd have been formed backed by a real majority of the
Kenyan électorale; a government, moreover, forced to deliver to more, if nol
all, Kenyans.
The argumenl lhal minorilies' interests are not taken care of in a
proportional system is false. On the contrary, the proportional system favours
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the minorities since by combining efforts they can make a major player and,
as KANU showed, could easily win the élections. The priée lo pay, some
argue, is political inslability characterised by frequent collapses of the cabinet.
But coalition governments exisl all over Ihe world and, in général, il seems
many Kenyans would prefer Ihis road towards greater democracy, especially
as it is more likely lo prevenl a fulure scénario of all open violence. Olherwise,
several élections recenlly conducted in Africa, e.g., South Africa in 1999,
illustrate that violence and corruption do not necessarily corne with voting.
No single élection is worth the loss of human lives, anywhere. As long as
Kenyans die simply because of state-organised or 'spontaneous' violence,
basic démocratie rights are slill al péril.
Under Ihe circumslances and limilalions of interprétation described above,
what conclusion can be drawn on thé prospects of democracy in Kenya? How
far hâve Kenyans liberated themselves from thé peculiar 'mindset' and social
relations precipilaled by décades of a system of corruption and brûlai
dictatorship? The opinion of many observers of the political scène in Kenya,
in particular, and in Africa in général, has been one of discouragement and
frustration. In thé words of Lemarchand (1995:1) 'After raising hopes of a
major political renewal, Africa's "second wave" of démocratisation seems to
be running out of steam. Afro-pessimism is again in fashion and many feel
lhal thé émergent trends are betler caplured by Ihe incessanl bloodshed in
Liberia, Somalia, and Burundi lhan by Ihe few success slories represenled
by South Africa, Bolswana and Bénin.'
The seeming failure of Ihe transition to democracy has been attributed to
many factors, including an opportunistic opposition whose only objective is
lo caplure thé slale lo promole ils own inleresls, thé divisive and disintegrative
effects of multi-partyism in an elhnicised political context, and the continuing
stale of underdevelopmenl in Ihe economy and Ihe infraslruclure. And, above
all, Ihere have been Ihe international forces which, in a hurry to globalise
democracy in me posl-Cold War period, hâve reduced il '. . . lo Ihe crude
simplicily of niulliparly élections to the benefit of some of the world's most
notorious autocrate, such as Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and Paul Biya of
Cameroon, who are now able to parade démocratie credenlials wilhoul
reforming Iheir répressive régimes' (Ake 1996:130).
Of course, there are many other factors that can be cited as possible
explanations for Ihis seeming growlh of électoral Systems without democratie
foundations. In spite of this gloomy political picture, however, the wave of
political libéralisation that has come with the struggle for political pluralism
has led lo certain developmenls whose combined effecl on the direction of
politics in Kenya promises to be positive. Of greatest significance, of course,
has been Ihe end of the culture of fear and silence which has forced open the
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pohtical space and created the possibility for the expression of alternative
political voices and for the articulation of different mterests as well as
mdividual and collective anger.
Regime autocracy has never experienced a more resolute challenge to its
legitimacy than in the recent years of multi-party politics, its many flaws
notwithstanding. While it is true that the political positions expressed in this
new dispensation have not been as ideologically distinct (and polarised) as
they were in the earlier phase of multi-partyism in Kenya, a wide range of
hitherto marginalised groups, including women, the unemployed, ethnie and
religious 'minorities', have become relatively more visible.
In the meantime, more traditional bodies, like trade unions, that were either
muzzled or co-opted, have now found room for recomposition and self-
rejuvenation. And organisations that were once pro-establishment or claimed
to be apolitical, like the Suprême Council of Kenya Muslims (Supkem), have
been politicised in a new direction, often being forced to participate in
challenging authoritanan and repressive rule. This is a conquered space that
Kenyans are unlikely to ever surrender again, at least not without a major
political battle.
An accompanying attribute of this reconfigured political arena has been
the destruction of the wall of invincibility of Daniel arap Moi, in particular,
and of the Kenyan presidency, at large. At one time, it was virtually
unthinkable to imagine the president facing opposition on an élection platform
or serving a term that is not life-long. In 1997 as in 1992 he was not only
challenged by several presidential candidates, but was actually forced to go
around the country begging for votes from the electorale to allow him
complete his final term of office. The president is attacked and ridiculed at
public platforms, is made a subject of litigation, and is routinely challenged
and contradicted in many of his pronouncements. Even when it has sometimes
assumed a crude form, this process is giving rise to the kind of political
psychology that is unlikely to accommodate a rebirth of the political
strongman syndrome that had bedevilled the nation since independence
For these gains to be Consolidated and deepened and for new ones to be
won, fyowever, there is much more that needs to be done as part of the process
of establishing a democratie system and culture in the country above and
beyond the periodic élections. Both the législature and the judiciary need to
be strengthened and institutions for the articulation of collective interests must
be developed. There needs to be a shift of emphasis in the struggle for rights,
from individual to collective. The very scope of rights must itself be expanded
to include not only rights of a political nature, but also economie, social and
cultural rights, and in a manner that is integrative. Without paying greater
attention to its socio-économie content, democracy is not likely to find root
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